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The Fourth Amendment And The Police
Use of "Pain Compliance" Techniques
on Nonviolent Arrestees*
A Presidential Commission presented the Wickersham Report1
to Congress in the early 1930s. The report documented and con-
demned brutal interrogation techniques commonly used on sus-
pects by law enforcement officials around the country. The report
called for police conduct respectful of the personal liberties guar-
anteed by the Constitution2 and became a pivotal influence in the
reformation of police practices and procedure.3 George W. Wicker-
sham, chairman of the Commission, stated in his introductory
comments that "[riespect for law, which is the fundamental pre-
requisite of law observance, hardly can be expected of people in
general if the officers charged with enforcement of the law do not
set the example of obedience to its precepts.'I
In the fall of 1989, the United States Commission on Civil
Rights reported that "a continuing flood of complaints and letters
of concern, "5 had been received from citizens across the country6
* The author wishes to express his sincere thanks to the many individuals who
contributed to this Comment.
1. U.S. NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT, U.S. Govt. Printing Office, pub. 11, at 24 (1931)
[hereinafter WICKERSHAM REPORT].
2. Id. at 2, 3.
3. The report's force was apparently felt by the Supreme Court as it deliberated
the Miranda case. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-47 (1966).
4. WICKERSHAM REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
5. Allegations of Police Misconduct in the Context of Non- Violent Public Dem-
onstrations: Briefing Before the US. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Sept. 15, 1989, at 2
[hereinafter Allegations].
6. Chairman Allen of the Commission reported that complaints originated in:
"with allegations of police misconduct in the context of public,
nonviolent demonstrations. " The Office of General Counsel of the
Commission detailed highlights of these complaints in a memo-
randum,8 together with an assessment of the legal standards and
remedies applicable to claims of excessive police force.9 As part of
its investigation of the complaints, the Commission also conducted
a public symposium at which police chiefs, other law enforcement
officials, federal prosecutors, civil rights protesters and others tes-
tified concerning the alleged police misconduct.10 Chairman Allen
of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, convinced that "the civil
rights of nonviolent, public demonstrators [had] been violated in
the administration of justice, "' formally petitioned Attorney Gen-
eral Thornburgh to initiate a Department of Justice investigation
Atlanta, Georgia; Boston, New Bedford, and Brookline, Massachusetts; Den-
ver, Colorado; Dayton, Ohio; Madison, Wisconsin; New York City; Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania; Los Angeles, San Diego, Sacramento and Santa Cruz, Califor-
nia; South Bend, Indiana; Las Vegas, Nevada; and West Hartford, Connecti-
cut. Complaints continue to arrive involving other jurisdictions. Many otherjurisdictions, I should add, have handled and continue to handle nonviolent,
public demonstrations without prompting charges of excessive force.
Letter from William B. Allen, Chmn., U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, to Att'y Gen. Rich-
ard Thornburgh (Sept. 22, 1989) prefacing Allegations, supra note 5, at 1-2 [hereinafter
Letter].
7. Allegations, supra note 5, at 2.
8. J. O'Connell, Administration of Justice in the Context of Public, Nonviolent
Demonstrations, U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RiGHS, 135 CONG. REc. S11351-57 (daily cd.
Sept. 19, 1989) (submission of Sen. Armstrong) [hereinafter J. O'Connell].
9. The following excerpt from the memo recounts a sampling of the reported
treatment:
At a recent Connecticut demonstration, a man who went limp when arrested
stated: "I was lifted slightly off the ground when one of the officers... twisted
my left wrist and lifted me... [S]omething popped in my left wrist. The pain
was immediate and intense and I came close to passing out... I was denied a
trip to the hospital because I wouldn't give my name."
Some individuals who withstood the pain of the holds found the pain compli-
ance escalate by use of combinations: "I was handcuffed behind my back with
flexible, elastic style restraints. Officers then applied extreme pain pressure to
my wrists in an attempt to make me stand. After I refused, pressure was ap-
plied to my ears and nose .... I was lifted off the ground by all of my weight
being hung on my wrists. I believe that my left arm was broken during this
procedure."
Another demonstrator claimed: "Twice I made the following statement to
the arresting officer and all of the officers there: 'Officer, we are peaceful, non-
violent, and will not resist. It is not necessary to inflict pain on us or to use
pressure points.' The response from the officer was, 'If you walk, we won't hurt
you.' "
Id. at S11352.
10. Allegations, supra note 5. Speakers at the September 15, 1989 briefing in-
cluded Linda K. Davis, Chief of the Criminal Section of the Civil Rights Division of the
Justice Department; Police Chief Robert McCue of West Hartford, CT; Asst. Chief
Melvin High of the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia; Don
Jackson, former police sergeant in Hawthorne, CA and currently Vice President of the
Santa Monica NAACP, Charles Litekey, a former priest and currently a nonviolent
peace activist; and Chet Gallagher, Las Vegas police officer and pro-life participant in
Operation Rescue operations.
11. Letter, supra note 6, at 2.
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into the issues raised by the complaints.
12
Members of Congress also received numerous complaints of
brutal police practices in encounters with nonviolent protesters.11
In response to the concerns raised by the complaints, an amend-
ment'4 was added to the Appropriations Act for the VA, HUD and
various independent agencies, in the waning days of the first ses-
sion of the 101st Congress. The text of the amendment is found in
House Report 2916 (H.R. 2916). The Act was passed by the
House and Senate and signed into law by President Bush. 5 The
amendment, proposed by Senator Armstrong of Colorado,'6 denied
Community Development Grants to any agency or municipality
which 'fails to adopt and enforce a policy prohibiting the use of
excessive force by law enforcement agencies. . .against any indi-
viduals engaged in nonviolent civil rights demonstrations."' 7 This
12. Id. at 1. The letter furnishes a summary of the complaints:
The complaints allege that police officials in several U.S. cities used, under
direct supervision, excessive and unnecessary force against passive demonstra-
tors in their arrest and post- arrest procedures. No one has complained of hav-
ing been arrested: the demonstrators fully expected and intended that. Rather,
the allegations, which should trouble anyone however they may view the merits
of the protests, include an unwarranted infliction of pain by police officials us-
ing pain compliance techniques; gross disregard for pain and injury resulting
from use of plastic handcuffs, which tighten further when persons wearing
them are subjected to pain compliance holds; continued use of plastic handcuffs
on persons for as long as eight hours while incarcerated; improper use of mace
on crowds which included women and children; improper use of nunchuks [sic],
a martial arts weapon; removal by police of identifying badges and nametags
based upon the rationale that these objects might injure demonstrators; denial
of the right to counsel; excessive or unreasonable bail; sexual abuse; and un-
warranted and improperly conducted strip and cavity searches of female de-
tainees by male guards in view of male prisoners. Complaints and affidavits
indicate many injuries, including fractures, dislocations, serious sprains, and
nerve damage.
13. 135 CONG. REC. S11358-11360 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Armstrong).
14. Sen. Armstrong's amendment was a revised version of an amendment initially
proposed by House Rep. Bob Walker, passed in the House, and eventually marked out by
the Senate Appropriations Committee. Walker's amendment would have denied funds to
a municipality in which three or more employees were convicted for use of excessive
force in handling of non-violent civil rights demonstrators. SENATE COMM. ON APPROPRI-
ATIONS, 101ST CONG., lST Sass., S. REP. No. 101-28, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (Sept. 6,
1989).
15. Departments of Veterans.Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and
Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-144, § 519, 103 Stat.
874 (1989) [hereinafter Appropriations Act].
16. Senator Armstrong, on the occasion of his proposing the amendment, brought
the alarming complaints of police behavior to the attention of his colleagues by inserting
the entire memorandum by Jeffrey O'Connell, Assistant General Counsel of the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, into the Congressional Record. He especially invited those
senators with strong stomachs to read the details. 135 CONG. REc. S11351 (daily ed.
Sept. 19, 1989) (statement of Sen. Armstrong).
17. The 'amendment as enacted reads:
threatened denial of potentially millions of federal dollars,18
evinced Congress' belief that such police behavior violates basic
civil rights and should be curtailed without delay.1 9
Congress' preventative action in passing H.R. 2916 may effec-
tively persuade municipalities to voluntarily avoid techniques
which could be considered excessively forceful when arresting pas-
sive resisters. But the provision does not define "excessive force;"
nor does it mention "'pain compliance." Courts have yet to
squarely address the fundamental legal issue underlying the al-
leged police misconduct: whether the deliberate infliction of severe
pain by officers on a passively resisting arrestee is an unreasonable
seizure under the fourth amendment.2 0 This comment addresses
that question by first considering the facts of a typical "pain com-
pliance" scenario based on a class action settled during trial
before the central California district court of the Ninth Circuit.2 1
Issues not relevant to the pain-infliction analysis are eliminated,
although the issue of standing for injunctive relief is examined.
Specific factors enumerated by the Supreme Court in Graham v.
Connor22 as necessary for an understanding of fourth amendment
"unreasonableness" in a given arrest context are then examined,
balanced, and applied to the 'pain compliance" scenario. Finally,
the Comment examines various definitions of "excessive force" to
conclude that unnecessary force in an arrest is unreasonable force.
That is, when alternative means of apprehension could be used on
a passively-resisting arrestee which are less injurious and intrusive
than the infliction of pain, the use of "pain compliance" consti-
tutes an unreasonable seizure.
None of the funds appropriated under title II of this Act under the heading
entitled Community Planning and Development, Community Development
Grants, to any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States
may be obligated or expended to any municipality that fails to adopt and en-
force a policy prohibiting the use of excessive force by law enforcement agen-
cies within the jurisdiction of said municipality against any individuals engaged
in nonviolent civil rights demonstrations.
Appropriations Act, supra note 14.
18. The L.A. Times reported that the city of Los Angeles "received almost $56
million in such grants in fiscal year 1989." Sipchen, Politics, Pain and the Police, L.A.
Times, Jan. 8, 1990, at A15, col. 3 [hereinafter Sipchen].
19. The rationale behind the amendment is well expressed in the joint Conference
Report on H.R. 2916, recommending passage:
The conferees strongly deplore reported instances of the use of excessive force
by law enforcement agencies in arresting nonviolent civil rights demonstrators.
Such misconduct by official governmental instrumentalities is exceedingly ob-
jectionable and offensive, and must be condemned and curbed with the imposi-
tion of effective policies to prevent any further occurrences. The Secretary of
the Department of Housing and Urban Development is therefore directed to
formulate adequate reporting and certification standards by
municipalities. ...
135 CONG. REC. H7201, H7216 (Oct. 18, 1989) [hereinafter JOINT REPOT].
20. Chairman Allen phrased the question as "what level of force may be properly
applied to persons passively rather than actively resisting arrest." Letter, supra note 6, at
2.
21. John v. City of Los Angeles, No. 89-4766 AWT (C.D. Cal. July 17, 1991).
22. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
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I. PAIN COMPLIANCE IN ACTION
"Pain compliance" is a catch-all phrase used to categorize a vari-
ety of pain-inducing techniques available to officers to "persuade" an
uncooperative arrestee to comply with their demands. For example,
an officer may place his or her fingers firmly on a subject's pressure
points; may insert his or her fingers in a subject's nose and pull up;
may twist the subject's arm(s); may bend backwards a subject's fin-
ger(s); or may press the subject in a sensitive spot with the officer's
baton.23 Depending on the technique, the pain induced can range
from mild discomfort to extreme and debilitating physical agony.
The use of a "nunchaku," '' 4 a martial arts lethal weapon, is a partic-
ularly painful technique recently introduced to some police depart-
ments."3 The nunchaku device modified for police use consists of two
twelve-inch plastic handles connected by a four-inch nylon cord.26
When the cord is torqued around limbs, the extreme pressure and
constricted circulation cause severe pain.27
In John v. City of Los Angeles,23 six plaintiffs on behalf of them-
23. A video-taped encounter between the nonviolent demonstrators and the Los
Angeles Police Department, reported by the Los Angeles Times, shows a variety of the
"pain compliance" techniques in use:
They press fingers under their noses. They dig their knuckles into protesters'
necks, and torque martial arts weapons around their wrists. At one point, two
officers twist a woman's arm till she rises from the ground, her face wrenched
in agony. In another scene, a young man winces as officers lead him along. His
arm, contorted behind his back, finally snaps.
Sipchen, supra note 18, at Al, col. 1.
24. Possession of the weapon is outlawed in California. CAL. PENAL CODE §
12020(a) (Deering 1989). The police version is often referred to as an OPN (Orcutt
Police Nunchaku), named after the individual who modified it for police use. Serrano, A
Question of Restraint, L.A. Times, Jan. 8, 1990, at E2, col. 3 [hereinafter Serrano].
25. The San Diego Police Department currently uses the device, with the approval
of the Citizen's Advisory Board on Police/Community Relations. The Board's Subcom-
mittee on Use of Force stated in an advisory memorandum: "[A]fter careful review of
the literature, presentations by Police Department personnel and public testimony we
have concluded that the current Department's proper use of the Nunchaka [sic] device,
on an individual basis, as well as their use at demonstrations and in crowd control should
be continued. However, we are not and cannot determine if the use of the Nunchaka
[sic] device has been appropriate in specific cases, since that is not properly within our
preview." San Diego Citizen's Advisory Board on Police/Community Relations, Recom-
mendation on the Use of Nunchakas [sic], June 13, 1989, at 1.
26. Serrano, supra note 24.
27. One finds disturbing similarity between accounts of the nunchaku in use and
Webster's common definition of "torture." In verb form torture is defined as "1: to cause
intense suffering to: TORMENT 2: to punish or coerce by inflicting excruciating pain 3:
to twist or wrench out of shape: DISTORT, WARP." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary 1246 (1985).
28. No. 89-4766 AWT (C.D. Cal. July 17, 1991).
selves and others similarly situated, filed suit2" against the City of
Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Police Department, Police Chief Daryl
Gates, and others. Their objective was to curtail the Los Angeles
Police Department's (LAPD) use of pain compliance techniques,
particularly that of the nunchaku, on "peaceful, non-violent individ-
uals" where other less injurious means of arrest are available. 30
Plaintiffs were engaged in a demonstration sponsored and organ-
ized by the pro-life activist group Operation Rescue.31 They had
blocked the entrance to an abortion clinic with their bodies in an
attempt "to prevent what they believe is the taking of human life." 32
Los Angeles police officers placed plaintiffs under arrest for trespass-
ing.3 3 Plaintiffs, however, remained on the ground in a limp fashion,
seated or curled in a fetal position.3 4 At this point, the alleged mis-
conduct of the police occurred:
Although he [plaintiff Fisher] was not locking arms or making his hands
inaccessible, he was stomped on his back by a police boot, slammed to the
concrete, and subjected to extreme pressure as both of his arms were raised
behind and upwards until one arm was broken, despite his cry "you are
breaking my limbs!" Then after Fisher expressly told police he would com-
ply voluntarily, particularly in view of his broken arm, defendants' arresting
officer still stuck his thumb in Fisher's nostril and raised Fisher by a lifting
pressure in his nose. At no time did Fisher struggle or provide any active
resistance against the officers.
Likewise, on June 10, 1989, the remaining plaintiffs all have testified that
they did not provide any active resistance whatsoever to the officers' actions.
Despite the fact that none of them were locking arms or participating in
any "human wormball" or anything of the sort,' they were nonetheless sub-
jected to "pain compliance" by nunchakus on both arms. In the case of
plaintiffs John, Frassett, and Santiago, the nunchakus were not released
even after they actually cooperated or said they would cooperate with the
police. Plaintiffs Harris and Houseman initially did not move because they
were "unable to stand" due to the pain. Eventually, both were "dragged"
29. The parties settled the case during trial and stipulated to a judgment, without
admission of wrongdoing, permanently enjoining defendants from using nunchakus
against plaintiff class members. The class was defined as "[a]ll persons who have been or
in the future will be subjected to pain compliance techniques in connection with their
arrest at Operation Rescue demonstrations within the City of Los Angeles." The order
included costs and attorney's fees for plaintiffs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988. Id.
30. Plaintiffs Supplemental Opening Memorandum in Support of Order to Show
Cause re Preliminary Injunction, at 2-3, John v. City of Los Angeles, No. 89-4766 AWT
(C.D. Cal. July 17, 1991) [hereinafter Plaintiffs Memo].
31. A "veteran" Operation Rescue activist, testifying before the U.S. Commission
on Civil Rights, described Operation Rescue as "a grass roots movement in this country,
made up of people from every religious background and every social and ethnic status,
who come together prayerfully, passively, and nonviolently, motivated to rescue the lives
of innocent children that they believe are going to be slaughtered unless they intervene
and prevent that slaughter." Allegations, supra note 5, at 32 (testimony of Chet
Gallagher).
32. Plaintiffis Memo, supra note 30, at 23.
33. CAL. PENAL CODE § 602(k)(1)(Deering 1989).
34. Operation Rescue "rescuers" assume a limp or fetal position when confronted
by police agents of the state as an expression of identification and solidarity with infants
vulnerable in the mother's womb. J. O'Connell, supra note 8, at 1, n.2.
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by police anyway, using the nunchakus that broke Housman's arm and
sprained Harris' wrist. Plaintiff John testified that Chris Keys, the first
demonstrator to be arrested on June 10, was "completely picked up and
suspended off the ground by defendants' police officers as he was carried to
the bus screaming in agony."3 5
This case provides the factual scenario for the analysis which
follows.
II. ELIMINATION OF ISSUES
The question presented by this scenario is whether it is lawful for
police to intentionally inflict severe pain on a non- violent, passive
arrestee to compel that person to walk. In order to sharpen the focus
of the question, it may be helpful to identify and eliminate several
threshold issues which are not central to this analysis.
First, for purposes of this Comment, it is presumed that sufficient
probable cause exists to justify an arrest. By placing the subject
under arrest the police officers are carrying out their lawful duty.
The issue is whether the manner of arrest employed by the police is
lawful.
Second, the California legislature has made resisting arrest by
passively going limp a statutory violation. The California Penal Code
states that "[e]very person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs
any public officer or peace officer, in the discharge or attempt to
discharge any duty of his office. . .is punishable. .... ",36 "Willful
resistance" has been construed by California courts to include "pas-
sive resistance. ' 37 The principal case on this point is In re Bacon,38
dating from the mid-sixties, in which the court held that Berkeley
students violated this statute. The students went limp when placed
under arrest so that police officers had to drag them out of the ad-
ministration building in which they had gathered for a political pro-
test "sit-in." The fact that the students' passive resistance was politi-
cally motivated did not, in the eyes of the court, make their behavior
35. Plaintiffs' Memo, supra note 30, at 7-8 (emphasis and citations omitted).
36. CAL. PENAL CODE § 148 (Deering 1989).
37. See People v. Curtis, 70 Cal. 2d 347, 450 P.2d 33, 74 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1969);
see also People v. Schehr, 88 IIl. App. 2d 287, 232 N.E. 2d 566 (1967); People ex rel.
Howell v. Knight, 35 Misc. 2d 216, 228 N.Y.S. 2d 981 (1962).
38. "We hold, therefore, that a person who goes limp and thereby requires the
arresting officer to drag or bodily lift and carry him in order to effect his arrest causes
such a delay and obstruction to lawful arrest as to constitute the offense of resisting an
officer as defined in section 148." In re Bacon, 240 Cal. App. 2d 34, 53, 49 Cal. Rptr.
322, 333 (1966).
any less a statutory violation. 9 "Going limp" before an arresting of-
ficer may be a form of political statement, but it has not been ac-
corded "free speech" constitutional protection.40
Understanding that passive resistance to an arrest is a statutory
violation helps one gain an appreciation of the arresting officers' per-
spective of passive arrestees. The arrestees, though religiously and/or
politically-motivated and non-violent, are nonetheless violating a
statute and deliberately making the officers' job burdensome. Yet,
violation of the law does not suspend an arrestee's Constitutional
rights nor authorize an unreasonable seizure.41
Third, police officers are entrusted with the authority to use force
to effect arrests. The California Penal Code provides that "[a]ny
peace officer who has reasonable cause to believe that the person to
be arrested has committed a public offense may use reasonable force
to effect the arrest, to prevent escape or to overcome resistance. '42
Citizens who place themselves in a position which invites arrest, and
who then resist arrest by going limp, must expect to be "handled" in
some way by police. The impasses created by an arrestee's refusal to
voluntarily get up and walk makes the use of some force a necessity,
if officers are to fulfill their duty to enforce the law. The issue, then,
is what degree of force is permissible to effect arrest in such
circumstances.
Lastly, this Comment does not take the position that all use of
pain compliance techniques is per se unconstitutional. In comparison
with other police responses on an "escalation of force" scale of as-
cending physical severity, pain compliance is placed on a lower to
intermediate rung.43 If the use of deadly force is not unconstitutional
in an arrest context under certain circumstances,44 it follows that
appropriate occasions arise for use of the lesser force of pain compli-
ance. Officers are routinely trained in pain compliance techniques,
39. Id.
40. This treatment may be challenged in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), which declared flag burning a form of speech
protected under the first amendment. See also U.S. v. Eichmen, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
41. See Ridley v. Leavitt, 631 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1980); Smith v. Hearod, 498
F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1974).
42. CAL. PENAL CODE § 835(a) (Deering 1989).
43. According to written guidelines of the Los Angeles Police Department, appro-
priate police responses in effectuating an arrest start with verbal persuasion and go on to
firm grip, pain compliance, chemical irritant, baton & pain compliance, kicks, taser, up-
per body control holds (modified carotid, full carotid, and locked carotid holds), and
finally firearms. L.A. Police Department, Use of Force Guidelines, Training Bulletin,
Vol. 18, Issue 5, (Sept. 1986) [hereinafter Guidelines].
44. In Garner, where the police shot and killed a fleeing, unarmed teenage suspect,
the Court concluded that, "such force may not be used unless necessary to prevent the
escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant
threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others." Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1 (1985).
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with new holds and methods continually being devised.4 5 The issue is
rather one of application; that is, whether pure pain can be used as a
means of coercion on a limp, non-violent arrestee to compel that per-
son to walk "when other less injurious, equally effective and safe
means exist to effect the lawful arrest of such individuals. 46
III. PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK FOR RELIEF: SECTION 1983 AND
EQUITABLE INJUNCTION
On the federal level, the primary cause of action available to chal-
lenge alleged police misconduct is a personal-claim for damages47
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 .48 A second, independent analysis
is required to determine the availability of equitable relief enjoining
the technique, across the board, from further use on anyone in simi-
lar circumstances.49 This secondary inquiry will entail a look at the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Los Angeles v. Lyons50 in which a
plaintiff seeking an injunction against the LAPD to enjoin their use
of chokeholds on non- threatening detainees was found to lack
standing.
A. Section 1983 Relief
The Act in which section 1983 is placed was "[o]riginally called
the Ku Klux Klan Act because of its focus on eliminating Klan ac-
45. Guidelines, supra note 43.
46. Plaintiffs' Memo, supra note 30, at 3.
47. Criminal liability also exists for police use of excessive force under 18 U.S.C. §
242 (Supp. 1990), which makes it unlawful for anyone acting under the color of law to
deprive an inhabitant of the U.S. of any federally protected right. The prosecution, un-
dertaken by the Criminal Section of the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department,
must establish an officer's subjective intent to use excessive force, and the standard of
proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). In
contrast, section 1983 claims need not inquire into the officer's subjective state, as will be
discussed in this Comment's Graham v. Connor analysis, and proof need only be estab-
lished by a preponderance of evidence. Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981). "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law. . . ." Id.
49. The plea in John v. City of Los Angeles, on behalf of plaintiffs and anyone else
similarly situated, was for a declaratory injunction enjoining the police from using
nunchakus and other pain compliance techniques "to move sitting civil rights demonstra-
tors who, as a routine feature of their protests, do nothing more than to passively refuse
to stand up and walk at the time of their arrest." Plaintiffs' Memo, supra note 30, at 2.
50. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
tivities which were terrorizing the South. 51 While state courts may
be active in curbing and redressing police misconduct, 52 the Supreme
Court has commented, "the statutory grant of federal jurisdiction
over section 1983 suits indicates that Congress, at least, continues to
adhere to the belief that police abuse is a sufficient threat to consti-
tutional rights to warrant a 'federal right in federal courts.' "3
Standing for bringing such a claim depends upon the satisfaction
of two elements:
By the plain terms of section 1983 two-and only two-allegations are re-
quired in order to state a cause of action under [42 U.S.C. section 1983].
First, the plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a fed-
eral right. Second, he must allege that the person who has deprived him of
that right acted under color of state. . .law."
The allegation of a violation of a federal right has been understood
to mean "rights protected by the Constitution, not. . .violations of
duties of care arising out of tort law." 55 Section 1983, therefore, "is
not itself a source of substantive rights"5 but a means to seek civil
redress for federal rights "elsewhere conferred. ' 57 The requirement,
then, is to "isolate the precise constitutional violation," as "[t]he first
inquiry in any section 1983 suit."' 58 In the passive arrestee-"pain
compliance" scenario, the allegation of a constitutional violation, as
required for section 1983 standing, flows directly from the fourth
amendment guarantee against an unreasonable seizure."9 The second
section 1983 element, that plaintiff allege the offender acted under
the color of state law, is easily satisfied where, as is typical in the
pain compliance context, the ones charged with misconduct are uni-
formed police officers and their superiors acting in the course of their
official duties.60
51. Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1498 (1lth Cir. 1985). The court
also stated, "[t]he legislative history of section 1983 has been outlined many times. See
Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 502-08 (1982); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225, 238-42 (1972).
52. See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
53. Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1499, quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180(1961). That this right of federal claim enjoys popular success is evidenced by the esti-
mated 20,000 to 30,000 section 1983 actions filed each year against law enforcement
officials. 194 N.Y.L.J. at 1, col. 1 (Nov. 19, 1985), taken from N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1985,
at 74, col. 1, quoting Wayne Schmidt, Executive Director, Americans for Effective Law
Enforcement.
54. Soto v. City of Sacramento, 567 F. Supp. 662, 669 (E.D. Cal. 1983), quoting
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
55. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979).
56. Id. at 144, n.3.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 140.
59. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated..." U.S.
CONsr. amend. IV.
60. Soto v. City of Sacramento, 567 F. Supp. 662, 669, n.l1 (E.D. Cal. 1983). The
specific criteria for police officers is whether "they were clothed with the authority of the
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B. Standing for Equitable Injunctive Relief
Plaintiffs in John v. City of Los Angeles first sought a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the LAPD from using pain compliance tech-
niques on all future non-violent demonstrators.6 1 This pre-trial re-
quest for a preliminary injunction was denied. 2 A dominant factor
in the injunctive relief standing analysis is the precedent laid down
in Los Angeles v. Lyons6 3 Lyons, stopped for a traffic violation,
neither resisted nor threatened the LAPD officers. Nevertheless, he
sustained serious injuries from their application of a chokehold 4
The Supreme Court (four justices dissenting) did not reach the ques-
tion of whether to enjoin the police use of chokeholds when an officer
is not threatened with deadly force.6 5 Instead, they found as a
threshold matter that Lyons lacked standing for his injunctive claim.
For Lyons to have established
an actual controversy in this case, [he] would have had not only to allege
that he would have another encounter with the police but also to make the
incredible assertion either (1) that all police officers in Los Angeles always
choke any citizen with whom they happen to have an encounter. . .or (2)
that the City ordered or authorized police officers to act in such manner
8
The Lyons requirement calls for a "sufficient likelihood" of reoc-
currence which would only be satisfied by the existence of official
approval or a stated policy endorsing the conduct, coupled with a
plaintiff's allegation of an anticipated future encounter with the con-
duct in question.6 7 While in the past the Court has emphasized its
reluctance to enjoin practice if the misconduct in question is sporadic
or unique, it had not heretofor required such a stringent individual-
ized test. As stated in Alee v. Medrano,:6 8
Isolated incidents of police misconduct under valid statutes would not, of
course, be cause for the exercise of a federal court's equitable powers. But
"[w]e have not hesitated on direct review to strike down applications of
constitutional statutes which we have found to be unconstitutionally ap-
plied." Where, as here there is a persistent pattern of police misconduct,
injunctive relief is appropriate. 9
state and were purporting to act thereunder." Id.
61. Plaintiffs Memo, supra note 30, at 2.
62. John v. City of Los Angeles, No. 89-4766 AWT (C.D. Cal. July 17, 1991).
63. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
64. Id. at 97-98.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 105-06 (emphasis in original).
67. Id. at 110-11.
68. 416 U.S. 802 (1974).
69. Plaintiffs Memo, supra note 30, at 16, quoting Allee, 416 U.S. at 815 (cita-
tions omitted). See also Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 620 (1968), citing Cox v.
Applying the Lyons analysis to the policy and conduct of the
LAPD at the time of the arrests in John v. City of Los Angles, one
finds that the departmental use of "pain compliance" techniques on
passive arrestees was not only a common practice but also an offi-
cially acknowledged police department policy. 0 As stated by one
captain, "other agencies have in the past elected to carry demonstra-
tors", but "historically, the LAPD has adopted the posture of forcing
the demonstrators to move through pain compliance techniques."1 1 A
lieutenant declared that "[u]pon review of alternative methods of ar-
restee control [and] prevailing tactics displayed by Operation Res-
cue/Pro-Choice demonstrators, management review deemed appro-
priate the continued use of pain compliance methods in control of
passive resistant demonstrators. 1 72
The passage of H.R. 2916 linking availability of grant monies to
policies designed to curb the use of excessive force by police may
result in the modification of many official municipal policies like that
articulated in John v. City of Los Angeles." An official municipal
rejection of the police policy of applying pain compliance techniques
on passive resisters, would eliminate the "continuing controversy"
and obviate the need for injunctive relief.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION: WHAT IS AN
'UNREASONABLE SEIZURE?
A. The Graham Test: Objective v. Subjective Factors
The determination of whether the police use of force in an arrest
is justifiable or excessive bypasses a tort analysis and is at once a
fourth amendment constitutional issue. This starting point was re-
cently clarified by the U.S. Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor, 4
where an action arose from the excessively rough treatment of a dia-
betic man by police who had stopped him for investigative pur-
poses. 5 The court stated:
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1963); Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1965); Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
70. The San Diego Police have likewise adopted the use of nunchakus on demon-
strators for "pain compliance purposes": "After careful review of the literature, presenta-
tions by [San Diego] Police Department personnel and public testimony we have con-
cluded that the current Department's proper use of the Nunchacka [sic] device, on an
individual basis, as well as their use at demonstrations and in crowd control should be
continued." Subcommittee on Use of Force, Citizens Advisory Board on Police/Commu-
nity Relations, Recommendation on the Use of Nunchakas [sic], San Diego, Cal. (June
13, 1989).
71. Plaintif's Memo, supra note 30, at 5.
72. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
73. See Joint Report, supra note 19.
74. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
75. The man, sensing an oncoming insulin reaction due to low blood sugar, had
hurried into a convenience store to buy orange juice to counteract his sugar imbalance.
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Where, as here, the excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest
or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as
one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees
citizens the right 'to be secure in their persons. . .against unreasona-
ble. . .seizures' of the person.76
The Graham Court reaffirmed the fourth amendment analysis of
manner of arrest/seizure cases developed in Tennessee v. Garner"
and Terry v. Ohio.7 8 The Graham court stated:
Today we make explicit what was implicit in Garner's analysis, and hold
that all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force-
deadly or not-in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure'
of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its
'reasonableness' standard, rather than under a 'substantive due process'
approach."9
This clarification was necessitated by the widespread application
by federal courts of a fourteenth amendment substantive due process
analysis to excessive force claims.80 The common ancestor of the
Finding the line at the counter too long, he rushed outside in a state of agitation and
started to drive to his girlfriend's house. In the mistaken belief that the man had robbed
the store, the policemen watching his behavior stopped him and denied his pleas for
medical assistance despite explanations (and proffered documentation in his wallet) of his
oncoming diabetic reaction. As the reaction ensued, he was cuffed tightly, shoved face-
first onto a car hood, and thrown headlong into the squad car. When the report came
from the convenience store that no robbery had transpired, the man, now suffering from
several serious injuries, was driven home. Graham, 490 U.S. at 388-89.
76. Id. at 394, quoting U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV. See also Lester v. City of Chicago,
830 F.2d 706, 713 (7th Cir. 1987), which states, "[tlo sum up, an excessive force in
arrest claim is quintessentially a Fourth Amendment claim."
77. "Whenever an officer restrains the freedom of person to walk away, he has
seized that person. While it is not always clear just when minimal police interference
becomes a seizure, there can be no question that apprehension by the use of deadly force
is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment." Ten-
nessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (citations omitted).
78. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), a suspect was detained and frisked for
weapons prior to arrest. The Court, inquiring into whether the fourth amendment gov-
erned the facts, stated, "It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person." Id. at 16.
See also Graham, 490 U.S. at 375, n.10, quoting Terry, at 392 U.S. 1, 19, n.16: "A
'seizure' triggering the Fourth Amendment's protections occurs only when government
actors have, "by means of physical force or show of authority. . .in some way restrained
the liberty of a citizen.'"
79. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
80. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033
(1973); United States v. Delerme, 457 F.2d 156, 157 (3rd Cir. 1972). This substantive
due process approach was combined with cruel and unusual punishment or unreasonable
seizure analysis from the eighth (Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272, 281-82 (3rd Cir.
1972)) and the fourth amendments (Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1231-32 (4th
Cir. 1970), overruled by Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986); McKenzie v. Lamb,
738 F.2d 1005 (9th Cir. 1984)). There also surfaced, in the case of a pre-trial detainee,
an inherent right against excessive force unrooted in any specific constitutional provision
substantive due process approach to these claims was Johnson v.
Glick81 in which Judge Friendly applied neither a fourth nor an
eighth amendment analysis to the claim of a pre-hearing detainee
assaulted by a correctional officer. Instead, he stated, "quite apart
from any 'specific' of the Bill of Rights, application of undue force
by law enforcement officers deprives a suspect of liberty without due
process of law."' 2 Johnson v. Glick adopted the phrase, "shocks the
conscience" as the constitutional line which, when crossed, branded
the conduct in question as constitutionally prohibited. 3 By providing
a working definition of the phrase, Judge Friendly created a measur-
ing stick by which to gauge "excessive force:"
the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and
the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, and
whether the force was applied in a good effort to maintain or restore disci-
pline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.8'
Until Graham, this was the test most used by the courts to deter-
mine the constitutionality of physical force applied by law enforce-
ment agents on citizens, free or imprisoned.85
The Graham court replaced the Johnson v. Glick test of "exces-
siveness" in the arrest context with a standard of "objective reasona-
bleness," to bring the analysis more into conformance with the lan-
guage of the fourth amendment.86 The Court furnished several
determinative factors to help courts gauge the reasonableness of po-
lice conduct in an arrest context. For organizational purposes, these
may be broken down into five distinct considerations:
1) Individual rights. Evaluation of the reasonableness of a seizure
requires "a careful balancing of the '"the nature and quality of the
(Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 383 (4th Cir. 1987), vacated by Justice v. Dennis, 109
S. Ct. 2461 (1989); cf. Allison v. California Adult Authority, 419 F.2d 822, 823 (9th
Cir. 1969); Brown v. Brown, 368 F.2d 992, 993 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
868 (1966).
81. 481 F.2d at 1032-33.
82. Id. See also the discussion of Johnson v. Glick, in Graham, 490 U.S. at 397-
99, and a helpful criticism of the application of the Johnson v. Glick due process stan-
dard to excessive force claims in Freyermuth, Rethinking Excessive Force, 1987 DUKE
L.J. 692.
83. Judge Friendly's determination found its basis in Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1951), where enforcement officers obtained evidence by forcefully extracting
the contents of a suspect's stomach. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter,
overturned the defendant's conviction based upon a due process clause violation, describ-
ing the police conduct as that which "shocks the conscience." Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
84. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033.
85. Virtually the same was the Gumz three-part test, used by some courts, which
categorized an enforcement officer's conduct as unconstitutional if it "1) caused severe
injuries; 2) was grossly disproportionate to the need for action under the circumstances;
and 3) was inspired by malice rather than merely careless or unwise excess of zeal so
that it amounted to an abuse of official power that shocks the conscience." Gumz v.
Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1400 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1123 (1986).
86. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 397 (1989).
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intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests"'
against"8 7
2) "[tjhe countervailing governmental interests at stake." 88
3) Totality of circumstances. Such a balancing demands "careful
attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, in-
cluding the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses
an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest
by flight."8 9
4) Perspective on the scene. The perspective used to judge the
"reasonableness" of any police behavior must be that of:
a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hind-
sight. . .The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowances for the
fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments-in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the
amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.90
5) Objective appraisal, regardless of subjective motive. The police
misconduct inquiry need not delve into questions of the officer's state
of mind, feelings and motivations. Rather, the inquiry should be
whether the behavior itself was objectively reasonable in light of the
aforementioned factors. 91
In summary, an excessive force analysis is not complete unless,
87. Id. at 396, quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985), quoting United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983).
88. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (emphasis added).
89. Id. The Graham Court noted the finding in Garner that the "question is
'whether the totality of the circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of. . .seizure." Id.,
quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. at 8-9.
The Graham "totality of the circumstances", adopted from Garner, follows the ap-
proach taken by the Court in other police- citizen encounters, namely, police searches
and police questioning of suspects. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226
(1973), in determining whether consent to search a car trunk had been voluntarily given,
the Court looked to its prior treatment of "voluntariness" in the context of police tech-
niques in questioning a suspect. In the decisions reviewed, the Court found that "none of
them turned on the presence or absence of a single controlling criterion; each reflected a
careful scrutiny of all the surrounding circumstances. . ." The Schneckloth Court then
applied the same "totality of circumstances" test to the determination of whether the
"consent to search was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion,
express or implied. . . ." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248.
90. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.
91. Id. referring also to Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-39 (1978) and
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
The Graham Court made clear that an inquiry into whether conduct was "malicious
and sadistic" has no bearing on whether a particular seizure is unreasonable under the
fourth amendment. This contrasts with the "less protective" eighth amendment analysis,
in the context of force used on convicted prisoners, in which inquiry into the officer's
state of mind is clearly called for. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.
from the on-the-scene perspective of a reasonable officer, the govern-
mental interests are balanced against the individual's private rights,
with a view to all the relevant surrounding circumstances, except the
state of mind of the seizing officer. This rule of objective reasonable-
ness, guided by specific balancing factors such as the nature and se-
verity of the crime, the degree of resistance, and some latitude for
split- second on-the-scene police decisions, creates what has been de-
scribed as a "lower threshold of liability." 2 That very difficult ele-
ment to prove,93 that the officer acted out of malice, is no longer
required. Thus, the Graham decision should make an excessive force
claim easier to establish than was possible under the Johnson v.
Glick substantive due process approach.
B. "Objective Reasonableness" in the "Pain Compliance" Arrest
The various factors supplied by the Graham Court for gauging
objective reasonableness,94 when applied to the typical non- violent,
limp arrestee scenario, provide a picture of what is reasonable police
conduct under the circumstances.
1. Individual Interests
Private interests which the courts have recognized in a "seizure"
setting include a right not to be subjected to unwarranted emotional
indignities, physical pain, and bodily injuries, as well as an expecta-
tion interest that if one behaves peaceably, one should not be treated
with violence by the police.
The Court in Terry v. Ohio 5 gave careful consideration to an in-
dividual's personal dignity interest. In reference to the "stop and
frisk" procedure, whereby an officer "pats down" a suspect's body in
a search for weapons, the Court remarked, "it is simply fantastic to
urge" that requiring a citizen to stand helpless against a wall with
arms raised could be considered a "petty indignity." ' 6 Rather, "[i]t
is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may
inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to
92. J. O'Connell, supra note 8, at S11354.
93. By way of comparison, under 18 U.S.C. section 242, one may be criminally
prosecuted for depriving a person of constitutional rights while acting under color of law.
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988). The section 242 charges against the eight National Guardsmen
who shot into the crowd of student demonstrators at Kent State were dismissed because
the judge found lacking the evidence of the defendants' willful, "specific intent" to de-
prive the victims of their rights. United States v. Shafer, 384 F.Supp. 496, 503-504
(N.D. Ohio 1974). The current statute, however, has been removed of its "willfullness"
language by a 1988 amendment.
94. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.
95. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
96. Id. at 16-17.
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be undertaken lightly. '9 7 Similarly, pain compliance measures also
directly affront an individual's personal dignity in that they are
designed to overcome the composure and self-contiol of the arrestee
and act to reduce the person to tears and often screams of agony.9s
Courts have also held that an individual need not establish serious
physical injury to bring an excessive force claim: pain and bruising
can suffice. The estate of the decedent arrestee in Gilmere v. City of
Atlanta"9 was found to have grounds for relief under the fourth
amendment for blows to the head the arrestee received at the hands
of police while being taken into custody.100 The dissent noted,
"[w]hile it is true that [the arrestee] experienced some physical dis-
comfort, there is not evidence that he was in any way injured in the
altercation; there were no marks of any kind upon [his] scalp, face,
or back." 10 1 Yet, the majority stated in reference to the blows "Pa-
tillo's fourth amendment interest in his bodily security was clearly
significant .. ."IO Likewise, in Linn v. Garcia,10 3 the plaintiff re-
ceived redress for non-permanent bruises and pain he had sustained
from the nightsticks of arresting officers, despite the fact that he re-
sisted arrest. In Robins v. Harum,04 a couple under arrest for mis-
demeanor violations and enroute to the station, was "manhan-
dled. . .without any apparent provocation" or resistance. The court
recognized as components of an unreasonable seizure injuries to the
man's wrist and back; the woman's bruises; and feelings by both of
humiliation and emotional trauma. 105 Thus, courts have held that
"excessive force" qualifies as an "unreasonable seizure" even when
the grievance falls short of permanent injury. "Pain compliance"
techniques have been shown to cause not only extreme pain, severe
bruising, and excessive humiliation, but also to carry a high likeli-
97. Id. at 17.
98. "Plaintiff John testified that Chris Keys, the first demonstrator to be arrested
on June 10, was 'completely picked up and suspended off the ground by defendant's
police officers as he was carried to the bus screaming in agony." Plaintif's Memo, supra
note 30, at 8.
99. 774 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1985).
100. The arrestee had threatened someone earlier with a gun, was in an unpredict-
able state of intoxication, and had initially put up some physical resistance to arrest.
Nevertheless, he had stopped resisting before the police started to hit him. The arrestee
reacted to the blows by wrenching free, grabbing for an officer's revolver, and lunging for
an officer, whereupon he was fatally shot in the stomach. Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1510.
101. Id. at 1509.
102. Id. at 1502.
103. 531 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1976).
104. 773 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1985).
105. Id. at 1011.
hood of lingering injury, such as broken bones and nerve damage.106
These decisions comport with the notion that nonviolent conduct
should entitle an arrestee to a reasonable expectation of receiving
nonviolent treatment from the p9lice. If a frisk is considered a "seri-
ous intrusion," and if instances of blows and bruising can confer lia-
bility, then the deliberate application of severe and injurious pain on
a passive arrestee must constitute an even more serious and unrea-
sonable intrusion. Clearly the overriding governmental interest must
be extremely great to warrant such a seizure.
2. Governmental interests
A number of critical governmental interests are at stake in the
typical nonviolent, limp arrestee scenario. The police are of course
charged with the governmental duty of enforcing the law and are
empowered to use force if necessary. In performing this duty, it is in
the interests of the officers and of society as a whole that they limit
the risk of injury to themselves and that they act with efficiency in
terms of time and manpower. 10 7
Lifting the dead weight of even one person poses a hazard capable
of causing officers serious back and leg injury. Officers are author-
ized to use force when their safety is threatened,108 but what degree
of force is reasonable to effectively counter passive resistance? While
pain compliance techniques may make it unnecessary for an officer
to lift a passive arrestee, that result is not guaranteed. In practice, it
turns out that "the use of the nunchakus [does] not eliminate nor
even thwart the necessity for the officer[s] to drag and lift the dem-
onstrators. . . In fact, there [are] those who [are] immobilized by
the 'pain compliance techniques.' "109
Alternative methods of removal used by various police depart-
ments include dragging, lifting, and the use of gurneys, stretchers,
and wheelchairs."10 None of the methods eliminates the need for a
certain amount of lifting by the officers in attendance. Nevertheless,
many police departments believe it is best not to resort to "pain com-
106. In a feature article on the "nunchaku," the L.A. Times reported another pro-
tester's experience with the lasting effect of the device: "a nurse and antiabortion pro-
tester from Poway [California], said she suffered sprained wrists and hands and nerve
damage to her thumbs and fingers. She was arrested with nunchakus at a demonstration
in April [1989] and today, 'I still can't hardly lift up a coffee cup,' she said." Serrano,
supra note 24, at E2, col. 1.
107. A pertinent, but not "countervailing" governmental interest is that of limiting
liability by conducting operations in accordance with state and federal law and previ-
ously set policy guidelines.
108. CAL PENAL CODE § 835(a) (Deering 1989).
109. Plaintiffs Memo, supra note 30, at 31-32.
110. J. O'Connell, supra note 8, at S11355.
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pliance" to induce passive resisters to walk.111 Instead, as ambulance
attendants do routinely, they lift the limp bodies using safety-con-
scious techniques and often transfer the load to a carrying device.
The Metropolitan Police Department of Washington, D.C., as a case
in point, is a force "uniquely experienced in the handling of demon-
strations." '112 Appearing before the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights, Assistant Chief Melvin High explained that, "[t]he Depart-
ment does not employ pain-inducing techniques of any sort in effect-
ing arrests in nonviolent situations. . . .Our officers are instructed
to bodily pick up and remove passive violators." 113 These examples
suggest that alternative removal techniques, done properly and with
assistance, can effectively minimize the health and safety risks which
passive resistance poses to arresting officers.
Another governmental interest is efficiency of time and manpower.
"Pain compliance," as an intimidation device, may be effective in
thinning the ranks of passive resisters. On-looking arrestees whose
turns have not yet come, may, by seeing their compatriots suffer, be
"persuaded" that the pain is not worth it and decide to cooperate
with the officers. Thus, while "pain compliance" measures still re-
quire the attendance of several officers per passive arrestee, as docu-
mented by eyewitness and video-taped accounts, 4 the time required
for arresting an entire group may possibly be shortened.
This efficiency argument in support of the use of "pain compli-
ance" is problematic. First, condoning police use of severe pain
against passive arrestees raises the unsettling values question of
whether this society's moral abhorrence of cruelty is giving way to
interests of convenience and economic efficiency.115 A second prob-
lem is the question of whether a means of arrest has been trans-
formed into a method of punishment. Eighth amendment jurispru-
dence categorizes deterrence of unlawful behavior as an end of
punishment.1 When officers take this purpose into their own hands
111. "Many other jurisdictions, I should add, have handled and continued to han-
dle nonviolent, public demonstrations without prompting charges of excessive force." Let-
ter, supra note 6, at 2.
112. Allegations, supra note 5, at 16.
113. Id.
114. Serrano, supra note 24, at El.
115. In the course of the "Allegations of Police Misconduct" hearing before the
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Chairman Allen remarked, "There's always the very
important question whether we aren't silently witnessing changes that we ought to be
paying a lot more attention to in the ordinary practices of police departments." Allega-
tions, supra note 5, at 30.
116. See Soto v. City of Sacramento, 567 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Cal. 1983) for a
they have crossed over the line from being custodians charged with
bringing an accused before the court to receive proper judgment to
becoming curbside ministers of "justice." 117 And thirdly, from a
practical standpoint there is the example of the Washington, D.C.
police force. Although this department faces probably the highest
volume of political protest of any in the country, its officers routinely
and effectively apprehend large numbers of passive arrestees without
resorting to "pain compliance" techniques." 8
3. Totality of Circumstances
In the context of the totality of circumstances, the excessiveness of
"pain compliance" techniques becomes even more apparent. The
Graham court listed "severity of the crime" as one factor,"119 which
in the case of trespassing rises only to the level of a misdemeanor.
Additionally, such a protester poses no "immediate threat" 120 of vio-
lence to officers or others. The body is a weight to move, but safe
removal methods are available and frequently practiced, as discussed
above. Whether such arrestees can be said to be "actively resisting
arrest"'' requires a more involved determination. Passive resistance
is certainly resistance, 22 but whether the Court intended to include
"deliberate inaction" within the compass of "active resistance" is not
readily apparent. The police use of physical coercion, such as a body
hold, the administration of pain, or the threatened or actual use of a
weapon, may be necessary to bring under control the suspect who
actively resists arrest by trying to escape or fighting the officer. How-
ever, a passive resister has yielded all physical control to the power
of the officer, choosing to become personally entirely vulnerable.
discussion of factors distinguishing force used in arrest from force used as punishment.
117. "Pain compliance" techniques may be chosen, some believe, for their value in
making an arrest an unforgettably disagreeable experience, i.e., as a method of punish-
ment. Officer Gallagher of the Las Vegas Police Department and a participant as arres-
tee in numerous Operation Rescues, expressed in the briefing before the U.S. Commis-
sion on Civil Rights, that from his "insider's" point of view, he perceived "a growing and
horrible abuse of what I prefer to call pre-due process punishment at various levels in our
criminal justice system." In police jargon, it is phrased:
"[T]hey may beat the rap but they won't beat the ride." Effectively what that
means, you see, is that as police officers, we have enough ways of making the
ride, that is, the arrest and everything that accompanies it, significant and oft-
entimes sufficient enough in terms of the punishment inflicted in a variety of
ways, that whether they serve the time for the alleged offense or not sometimes
didn't really matter.
Allegations, supra note 5, at 32, 34 (testimony of Mr. Gallagher).
118. Id. at 16.
119. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 396.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 148 (Deering 1989) and In re Bacon, 240 Cal. App.
2d 34, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1966), discussed earlier.
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4. On-the-Scene Perspective
Graham requires that the reasonableness judgment be made
"from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene." 123 The
rationale for viewing an incident from this perspective is to allow for
the necessity of decisions made in haste by officers in the midst of
rapidly unfolding circumstances. However, this is not the context of
the typical passive arrestee scenario. Typically, police are well aware
of the tactics employed by these passive protesters far in advance of
the confrontation, so that police departments have considerable time
to prepare alternative law enforcement strategies to deal with the
behavior. 124
5. Objective, Not Subjective Analysis
The arresting officer's personal prejudices and prevailing police de-
partment attitudes can have a tremendous influence on the kind of
physical treatment arrestees receive. Don Jackson, a former Haw-
thorne, California police sergeant and current Vice President of the
Santa Monica NAACP,1 25 testified before the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights regarding the statistically higher likelihood that people
of minority races will be victims of police brutality.126 Attitudes
other than racism can also make certain groups likely victims. He
stated, "I think that there is a cohesive fabric of [police] misconduct
which is tolerable. There are allowable mistakes, particularly against
certain unwelcome groups, be you a poor person, a transient, a
homeless person. You can make a lot more mistakes with that person
123. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-397.
124. "The methodology utilized for control on March 25, 1989, was predicated
upon review... of previous [Operation Rescue] incidents, LAPD policy and resources
available." Plaintiffs' Memo, supra note 30, at 4.
125. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
126. Mr. Jackson was himself the recipient of severe police beating, much of which
was filmed by a hidden NBC camera crew. He stated, "I have videotaped over 300 in-
stances of police contacts with citizens, and I must say I would truly be remiss if I didn't
point out that police violence is a common, everyday occurrence that African-Americans
face on the streets when contacted by police officers." Allegations, supra note 5, at 26
(testimony of Mr. Jackson).
This observation was later shockingly substantiated by the videotaped "March 3
[1991] beating of black motorist Rodney King by white officers [which] has unleashed a
torrent of complaints about police brutality against Los Angeles minorities. The outcry
[raised by the King incident] has prompted local and federal officials to launch widening
investigations into claims of excessive force and racism among the LAPD." Meyer, Gates
Wins Loud Support of Minority-Officer Groups Despite Division in Ranks, The San
Diego Union, Mar. 24, 1991, at A14, col. 1.
and get away with it."'""
The plaintiffs in the factual scenario referred to in this Comment,
because of their controversial views and/or conduct, are an "unwel-
come group" to many, which may account for some difference in the
treatment they received at the hands of police in comparison with
passive resisters of other causes. However, because the Graham
Court directed that the "objective reasonableness" analysis bypass
an inquiry into the officer's subjective intent, proof that an officer
acted maliciously, whether out of racial, religious, political or other
bias, need not be established. 128
C. The Graham Balancing Act
The Graham test requires a careful weighing of the individual's
fourth amendment interest against the countervailing governmental
interests, viewed in the context of the totality of circumstances and
from the perspective of the reasonable officer on the scene.129 The
previous analysis indicates that "pain compliance" on a passive ar-
restee severely intrudes upon that individual's interests in his own
bodily security and personal dignity, fourth amendment interests vi-
tal to the "sanctity of the person."'130
On the other side of the scale, the countervailing governmental
interests of duty to arrest, officer safety, and economy of means in
time and manpower, have each been shown to be effectively accom-
plished without the application of "pain compliance." "Pain compli-
ance" may save some time and effort by its intimidating effect, but
not without an accompanying moral cost of callousness to suffering,
a severe intrusion on fourth amendment interests, and a tacit ap-
proval of "curbside punishment."
Finally, the argument is unpersuasive that reasonable officers in
the field would deem such techniques objectively reasonable when a
look at the totality of the circumstances reveals the minimal threat
to officer safety in passive rather than violent resistance arrest situa-
tions, the availability of alternative safe methods to seize passive re-
sisters, and the generous advance warning that obviates the need for
split-second police decision-making. These factors all point to the
conclusion that the application of "pain compliance" on a passively
resisting arrestee fails to pass the "objectively reasonable" Graham
test under the fourth amendment.
127. Id. at 29.
128. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 397-399.
129. Id. at 396.
130. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968).
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D. "Unreasonable Seizure" as Otherwise Defined
Aside from the Graham factor analysis, the prevalent understand-
ing of a reasonable seizure, among both courts and police agencies, is
that the seizure be carried out using only the amount of force which
is minimally necessary to effect the arrest.1 31
Chief Melvin High of the Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police
Department reported that "[i]n a nonviolent demonstration. . .our
police officers are trained to use the least amount of force necessary
in effecting an arrest."'3 2 Interestingly, the Los Angeles Police De-
partment, in its official Training Bulletin, adheres to a similar pol-
icy.133 The Training Bulletin states:
While the use of reasonable physical force 'may be necessary in situations
which cannot otherwise be controlled, force may not be resorted to unless
other reasonable alternatives have exhausted or would clearly be ineffective
under the particular circumstances. T"
Further,
only that force which is necessary may be used to gain control or resist
attack. .... .35
Also,
[i]n situations when physical force is applied, an officer must escalate or de-
escalate to the reasonable and necessary amount of force as it directly cor-
relates to the suspect's action. 38
And again,
[a]n officer may use only minimum reasonable force necessary to control
the suspect."'
A number of courts have agreed that "reasonable force" means
force that is "reasonably" or "minimally necessary" to effect ar-
rest.1 38 In Gilmere, the court found determinative the fact that "the
.131. If "minimum force necessary" is not the standard, there exists no barrier to
the logical extension of pain compliance. That is, "[s]uppose the person is able to resist
the pain? How far do we go then? Do we go ahead and break the arm, and when you've
broken one arm or when you've broken one finger, do you start on another finger?" Alle-
gations, supra note 5, at 31 (testimony of Mr. Litekey).
132. Id. at 16 (testimony of Mr. High).
133. The California Penal Code also mirrors the interpretation of reasonable force
as that which is the least amount necessary, stating: "Every public officer who under
color of authority, without lawful necessity, assaults or beats any person, is punisha-
ble. . ." CAL. PENAL CODE § 149 (Deering 1989).
134. Guidelines, supra note 43, at 1 (emphasis in the original).
135. Id. at 2.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., People v. Brite, 9 Cal. 2d 666, 681, 72 P.2d 122 (1937); People v.
Lopez, 222 Cal. App. 682, 685, 35 Cal. Rptr. 426, 428 (1963).
harms visited on the [arrestee]. . .were only minimally, if at all,
necessary to enable [the officers] to carry out their official duties. 1 39
Similarly, the high court of Kentucky stated in Adler v.
Commonwealth:
[A]n officer having the right to arrest a misdemeanant may use such force
as is reasonably necessary to effect his purpose, but no more; he must avoid
the use of unnecessary force or violence, and if there be resistance he may
use such force as may be required under the circumstances to overcome the
resistance. 40
Even in the days of the Wild West, a Texas state court141 held that a
marshall's use of violence to remove an obstinant inebriant was un-
necessary and inappropriate. Instead, the court found that the rea-
sonable alternative required of the marshall was to get help to carry
the man.1 42 Today, should not the same decency and respect be ac-
corded a protester who is uncooperative for political or religious
reasons?143
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,144 balanced
individual rights against governmental interests in the context of vol-
untary versus involuntary consent to search. The Court looked to the
analogous context of police questioning of suspects, and stated:
Without such investigation, those who were innocent might be falsely ac-
cused, those who were guilty might wholly escape prosecution, and many
crimes would go unsolved. In short, the security of all would be dimin-
ished. . . .At the other end of the spectrum is the set of values reflecting
139. Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1502 (11th Cir. 1985).
140. Alder v. Commonwealth, 211 S.W.2d 678, 679-80 (Ky. Ct. App., 1948), as
found in 4 Am. Jur. Sec. 73 et seq. The rule is expressed in Sec. 43, [Kentucky] Crimi-
nal Code of Practice: 'No unnecessary force or violence shall be used in making the
arrest.'"
141.. Skidmore v. State, 43 Tex. 93 (1875), describes the arrest of an intoxicated
man who refused to accompany the marshall to the "calaboose" (from the Spanish
calabozo, that is dungeon, or local jail. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 195
(1985)). The marshall responded to his refusal by striking him on the head with his six-
shooter, causing a one-inch gash. The Texas Supreme Court upheld the arrestee's claim
for excessive force, noting:
[T]here were two men within the distance of eighty-four feet from [the mar-
shall] upon whom he could have called for assistance to carry the drunken man
to prison. The code provides that in making an arrest no greater force shall be
resorted to than is necessary to secure the arrest and detention of the accused.
(Pashal's Dig. Art. 2697).
Skidmore, 43 Tex. at 94.
142. Id.
143. One panelist before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights remarked:
I realize that [weight resistance] present[s] a logistical problem for the police,
especially when there are large numbers of people involved. But a long time
ago I read something like the level of a civilization of a given society can be
determined by the way we [sic] treat those who break the laws.
Allegations, supra note 5, at 31 (comments of Mr. Litekey).
144. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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society's deeply felt belief that the criminal law cannot be used as an instru-
ment of unfairness, and that the possibility of unfair and even brutal police
tactics poses a real and serious threat to civilized notions of justice.14 5
The same balancing of legitimate interests is required in examin-
ing the question of what degree of force is constitutional in the tak-
ing into custody of limp, nonviolent arrestees. This country prides
itself on its accommodation of civil protest, divergent political per-
suasions, and of the free exercise of religious beliefs. Yet, when pro-
test takes the form of civil disobedience, protesters must expect law
enforcement agencies to uphold and enforce the laws of the land
with physical force if necessary.
The fourth amendment, however, mandates that a legitimate
seizure not be made unreasonably. The Graham test furnishes a
workable standard for measuring the reasonableness of force. When
applied to the "reasonableness" of using "pain compliance" to appre-
hend passively resisting arrestees, the analysis reveals that the im-
portant governmental interests of law enforcement, officer safety,
and economic efficiency do not outweigh the individual's fourth
amendment interests in physical security and personal dignity, par-
ticularly in light of the nonviolent arrestee's behavior and the availa-
bility of effective apprehension alternatives. This tipping of the bal-
ance in favor of the individual comports with the time-honored legal
and conventional belief that "unnecessary force" is "unreasonable
force."
BENJAMIN I. WHIPPLE
145. Id. at 225 (citations omitted).

